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ABSTRACT 
Han Feizi’s criticisms of  Confucian and Mohist political recommendations are often 
thought to involve materialist or historicist arguments, independently of  their 
epistemological features. Drawing largely on Amia Srinivasan’s recent taxonomy of  
genealogical arguments, this paper proposes a genealogical reading of  passages in “The 
Five Vermin [五蠹 wudu]” and “Eminence in Learning [顯學 xianxue].” This reveals Han 
Feizi’s arguments to be more comprehensively appreciated as problematizing Confucian 
and Mohist political judgments as arising from undermining contingencies, rendering them 
irrelevant, if  not detrimental, to any lasting excellence of  a state. In doing this, it is also 
suggested that there is a ‘master argument’ underlying Han Feizi’s criticisms, according to 
which the epistemology of  the Confucians and Mohists are fundamentally unreliable. 
Introduction 
Approaches thus far to Han Feizi’s criticisms of  the political recommendations of  the Confucians and 
Mohists [儒墨 Ru-Mo], in the infamous chapters Ch. 49 “The Five Vermin [五蠹 wudu]” and Ch. 50 
“Eminence in Learning [顯學 xianxue],” may be broadly characterized as materialist or historicist (or 
some combination of  the two). That is, respectively, they interpret him as either as privileging “natural 
facts that constrain and provide conditions for an ordered state” over Ru-Mo talk of  morality (Harris 
2013a, 107–9), or as targeting the “historical constancy” of  the Ru-Mo, in that they fail to appreciate 
“the uniqueness of  the historical situation in which one finds oneself  and by which one’s circumstances 
differ from those of  the past” (Cook 2015, 67–8; cf. Hutton 2008). Correspondingly, rejoinders to Han 
Feizi’s criticisms, so construed, have largely been made on the bases of  a more expansive morality that 
takes natural facts into account, or attending to the pedagogical nature of  historical imagination (e.g. 
Kim 2012, Harris 2013b, Wilson 2018).  In this chapter, I propose a third, more comprehensive, 1
genealogical approach to Han Feizi’s criticisms: that Ru-Mo political judgments arise problematically out 
of  contingencies in a way that renders them inappropriate, even detrimental, for statecraft. That is, the 
Ru-Mo are (allegedly) quixotic and ignorant, because they are epistemologically deficient. 
Over the past couple of  decades, there has been a growing interest in theorizing about genealogy as a 
philosophical method (e.g. Saar 2002, Koopman 2013, Srinivasan forthcoming)—where ‘genealogy’ is 
broadly understood to mean “a narrative that tries to explain a cultural phenomenon [e.g. a judgment, 
concept, or practice] by describing a way in which it came about, or could have come about, or might 
be imagined to have come about” (Williams 2002, 20). Perhaps the most famous instance of  the use of  
genealogical argumentation is Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of  Morals, but more contemporary instances 
range from ongoing conceptual engineering in analytic social philosophy (e.g. Fricker 2007), 
experimental philosophy’s (aka x-phi) cleansing of  philosophical practice (Srinivasan 2015, 326–7; cf. 
Knobe and Nichols 2014), to the decolonization of  Critical Theory (Allen 2016). However, at the same 
time, it is crucial that such increasing theoretical attention to the genealogical method should also pay 
heed to its own history (or histories) as a method throughout the history of  philosophy.  This is 2
 I will largely be concerned with Confucian rejoinders here, since almost all of them have been made on behalf of the 1
Confucians (cf. Harris 2020).
 For some examples of attempts at a ‘genealogy of genealogy’ largely within the Anglo-European canon, see Forster 2
2011 and Srinivasan 2015.
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especially important if  any critical genealogy is to avoid what Amia Srinivasan calls the “spectre of  self-
defeat” (Srinivasan 2015, 328), where the genealogical sceptic would have neither reason to accept their 
own argument’s conclusion nor be able to offer others reasons to accept it—which has more than 
epistemological ramifications (e.g. neocolonialism in philosophy). 
While I do not imagine Han Feizi to have been unique in employing any sort of  genealogical method in 
the classical Chinese canon,  I am particularly interested here not just in how his synoptic approach to 3
the philosophers before him is an important starting point for a ‘genealogy of  genealogy’ in Warring 
States philosophy, but also in how attending to Han Feizi’s critiques of  the Ru-Mo as genealogical helps 
us to better appreciate their hitherto neglected epistemological dimension. This is especially because the 
implicit epistemology of  this explicitly political text has largely been underemphasized by scholars—
with the fleeting exception of  those attending to Ch. 12 “The Difficulties of  Persuasion [說難 shuinan]” 
and Chs. 22–23 “Collected Persuasions [說林 shuilin]” (e.g. Goldin 2013, Hunter 2013).  As such, my 4
aim here is to mainly show how, for Han Feizi, a significant problem with Ru-Mo recommendations is 
distinctively epistemological in character and that the vulnerability of  such judgments to genealogical 
contingency is endemic to the very political epistemology assumed by the Ru-Mo. As such, the 
aforementioned rejoinders would not be sufficient to overcome the full extent of  Han Feizi’s criticisms. 
For the purposes of  this investigation, I approach “The Five Vermin” and “Eminence in Learning” as 
containing genealogical argumentation inasmuch as I take them to involve what would be called 
‘debunking arguments’ in the idiom of  analytic philosophy.  That is, I take them to involve a kind of  5
genealogical argumentation that analyzes judgments (often those that purport necessity) as unjustified 
products given the contingencies of  their origins (cf. Srinivasan 2015).  While, for any justified 6
proposition p, a straightforward counter-argument might provide overriding epistemic defeat by 
asserting ¬p with greater justification, a debunking argument would instead provide undermining defeat, 
asserting “either that the source [of  justification for p] is defective in some way […] or that the source 
is operating in an environment for which it was not well adapted” (Casullo 2003, 45–6).  For example, 7
‘you only believe that onions would cure you because you read it on a Facebook post’. This kind of  
‘shameful’, negative genealogical argumentation is often contrasted with a ‘vindicatory’ positive kind, 
which analyze judgments as justified products, given the contingencies of  their origins (Williams 2002, 
35–8): examples of  which would include Bernards Williams on truth, Miranda Fricker on testimonial 
justice, and perhaps even Xunzi on the Confucian rituals (see Cua 2000). A debunking approach would 
not be inconsistent with Han Feizi’s own advice in “The Difficulties of  Persuasion,” where he remarks 
that if  someone to be persuaded “has some lofty objective in mind and yet [reality does not match up 
to it], you should do your best to point out to him the faults and bad aspects of  such an objective and 
make it seem a virtue not to pursue it” (Han Feizi, trans. Watson, 75).  8
In what follows, then, I first briefly outline the epistemological framework that I am broadly assuming 
for the late Warring States thinkers (§1). The epistemology of  Han Feizi’s criticisms in “The Five 
Vermin” and “Eminence in Learning” will then be revealed by way of  interpreting passages from them 
alongside Srinivasan’s taxonomy of  negative genealogical arguments (§2). In doing so, I will also suggest 
that there is a ‘master argument’ (from unreliability) which underlies the rest (§3). 
1. Epistemology in the Late Warring States Period 
 Cf. Michael Puett’s argument that the Daodejing makes “a genealogical claim in which the adept is able to appropriate 3
and thus gain the powers of the ultimate ancestor of the cosmos” (Puett 2002, 167).
 In stark contrast to the attention paid to the epistemology of, say, the Zhuangzi (see Kjellberg and Ivanhoe 1996).4
 This is, of course, not to say that it is the only way genealogy would feature, or might be approached, in the text.5
 For other analyses of the philosophical use of genealogy in the analytic idiom, see, e.g., Williams 2000, Geuss 2002.6
 For a recent discussion of overriding vs undermining epistemic defeaters, see Melis 2014.7
 Watson’s original translation for ⽽實不能及 ershibunengji is ‘yet does not have the ability needed to realize it’.8
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In order to show how such a reading would even make sense to begin with, how I will be using 
‘epistemology’ here should first be clarified, such that the historical dissonances in appealing to 
Srinivasan’s taxonomy would not threaten to derail the approach. Of  course, I do not mean that we can 
find straightforward translations of  contemporary anglophone terms like ‘truth’, ‘judgment’, 
‘knowledge’ in the Han Feizi. Rather, I will be using Chris Fraser’s recent framework for distinctions, 
judgments, and reasoning in classical Chinese thought, which allows us a way to attend to functional 
equivalences between contemporary epistemology and the discussions of  the relationship between ming 
[名] and shi [實] in the text.  One may perhaps hesitate at Fraser’s extension of  the Mohists and Xunzi’s 9
epistemology to characterize the epistemological framework of  the rest of  the classical Chinese period, 
but, insofar as we are considering Han Feizi’s criticisms, it is reasonable to think that the reputed 
student of  Xunzi would regard Confucians as working within such a framework. 
I thus follow Fraser in understanding correct judgments to correspond to the correct tallying of  ming 
[名] and shi [實], where one has the correct “attitude of  distinguishing an object [shi] as being of  the 
kind denoted by some term [ming]” (Fraser 2013, 10). To refer, or not to refer, to a given shi (like a 
bladed weapon) by a ming (like ‘sword’)—to affirm that something is [是 shi] or is not [⾮ fei]—is to 
distinguish whether the shi under consideration is similar to, or different from, a model [法 fa]  of  the 10
kind denoted through an analogical comparison (like Moye).  A certain judgment being true, then, is a 11
matter of  there being a similarity between its implied shi and the paradigmatic shi in the fa, and having 
knowledge, further, is a matter of  having “a reliable ability to draw distinctions [among objects] 
correctly, manifested by an ability to apply terms correctly.”  As we can see from this, justification 12
takes an explicit reliabilist form here.  Along the same lines, reasoning “is treated as a process of  13
considering how some acts of  term predication, or drawing distinctions, normatively commit one to 
making further, analogous predications or drawing further, analogous distinctions” (Fraser 2013, 4). 
Argumentation then, ordinarily, takes the form of  the activity of  ascertaining whether a certain object 
is analogous to a proposed model, asserting and explaining that it is (shiis), if  so, and that it is not (feiis 
not), if  not. For example, if  one disputes over whether a bladed weapon should be referred to as a 
sword, one would cite the Moye and explain why the given weapon is similar or not to it.  14
Models [fa] have been understood for at least three different phenomena in the classical Chinese texts: 
model agents (such as the sage-king Yao), model actions (such as being frugal), and model objects (such as 
Moye). Whether such semantic distinctions were actually made back then is an open question. But what 
matters is that in all three senses (but especially the first two), judgments are emphasized in the texts as 
being action-guiding. So we can see from all this how such epistemic models would be politically crucial 
for state administration: they are meant to preserve and strengthen the state through their role in the 
discriminations, and consequent behaviour, of  both ruler and ruled. After all, the term ‘fa’, as Sor-Hoon 
Tan notes, had varied meanings in the Warring States period, ranging from ‘standards’, ‘models’, 
‘regulations’, to ‘laws’ (Tan 2011).  15
By highlighting the regulatory role of  models in political judgments this way, we open up the possibility 
of  approaching Han Feizi’s criticisms of  the Ru-Mo political recommendations as also epistemological 
 For other approaches to early Chinese epistemology, see, e.g., Harbsmeier 1993, Geaney 2002, Rošker 2002, and 9
Allen 2015.
 also, standard [表 biao] or paradigm [隆 long].10
 Moye [鏌鋣] was the legendary sword of King Helü of Wu (cf. Zhuangzi Ch. 6, Xunzi 15.59–60, 16.3).11
 For other accounts of truth in classical Chinese thought, see Hansen 1985 and McLeod 2016.12
 For reliabilism in contemporary epistemology, see Goldman 2012.13
 This is perhaps analogous to aristocratic resemblance nominalism in analytic metaphysics, in which a given object 14
belongs to a particular property class inasmuch as it resembles the appropriate exemplars (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, cf. 
Price 1953).
 It is disputed whether ‘fa’ changed its meaning during the late Warring States period to only refer to penal codes, but in 15
either case this would not affect the epistemic role that fa plays in judgment (see Graham 1989, Hansen 1994).
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criticisms—approaching them as arguments against the tenability of  the models assumed by the Ru-
Mo’s political judgments.  For Han Feizi, “fa is the key to all sociopolitical affairs, the ming-shi 16
relationship is not merely a linguistic issue; rather, it is a sharp embodiment of  sociopolitical affairs” 
(Sun 2015, 75). The models of  the Confucians would be understood as the Zhou Rituals [周禮 zhouli], 
while those of  the Mohists were the Three Standards/Models [三表/法 sanbiao/fa]—both converging 
on appeals to the affairs of  the sage-kings as models (such as the paradigmatic case of  benevolent 
action being Yao’s abdication).  Moreover, during Han Feizi’s time, the Ru-Mo would even come to 17
regard Confucius and Mozi as models. 
But why approach them as undermining arguments against the tenability of  the models of  the Ru-Mo 
rather than ordinary overriding refutations of  their political judgments? To answer this, we must briefly 
turn to observe Han Feizi’s own use and discussion of  models, which are circumscribed within the 
more explicitly political discourse of  the text. He explicitly equates ming with official titles and speeches 
[⾔ yan], and shi with performances [形 xing] and affairs [事 shi],  and we might thus understand 18
correct political judgments for him to involve the tallying of  official titles and speeches with affairs and 
performances, according to the appropriate models [fa]. Han Feizi notes that the enlightened (ideal) ruler 
is to “use laws [fa] to govern the state, disposing of  all matters on their basis alone” (Han Feizi, “On 
Having Standards [有度 youdu],” trans. Watson, 28), and this involves using “laws [fa] to rectify the 
mind” (Han Feizi, “How to Use Men [⽤⼈ yongren],” trans. Liao 1959a, 271).  19
All this still runs largely parallel to the political epistemology of  the Ru-Mo. In the Analects, for 
example, Confucius remarks that when the Zhou Rituals “do not flourish, […] the common people will 
not know where to put hand and foot” (Analects 13.3). Where Han Feizi and the Ru-Mo diverge, then, 
is that instead of  appealing to the affairs of  the sage-kings as appropriate political models for the 
preservation and strengthening of  the state, Han Feizi holds that the models are to be established by 
the enlightened ruler himself. The ruler’s subordinates are then to judge (and hence act) according to 
these established models. For the ruler himself, however, his correct political judgment is not found in 
appealing to past models, but rather he “lets names [ming] define themselves and affairs [shi] reach their 
own settlement [令名⾃命也 lingmingzimingye，令事⾃定也 lingshizidingye]” (Han Feizi, “The Way of  
the Ruler [主道 zhudao],” trans. Watson, 15). It is then upon this basis that the ruler is to craft models 
for his subordinates. 
To note, ‘letting names define themselves and affairs reach their own settlement’ may admit of  at least 
two interpretations given the text. In the first interpretation, the ruler is to employ models that are not 
from the sage-kings, but instead from his own response to what is shown in the present circumstances 
to directly contribute to the preservation and strengthening of  the state (notably, approximating to one 
of  the Mohists’ own Standards; cf. Harris 2020). As Randall P. Peerenboom puts it, “In the final word, 
law is what the ruler says it is; it is what pleases the ruler” (Peerenboom 1993, 143). In the second 
interpretation, however, the ruler is to attend to the way things naturally are, which could perhaps be 
conceived of  as models of  nature—especially if  we are to take his references to the Huang-Lao 
tradition as reflective of  a commitment to a naturalism about normativity.  Paul R. Goldin notes that 20
this ambiguity could be due to a possible range of  factors: textual corruption, editorial inconsistencies, 
ministerial rhetoric, or a strategic appropriation of  Huang-Lao vocabulary (Goldin 2013, 16). 
 This may resonate with the burgeoning field of ‘ideational political epistemology’ (see Friedman 2014).16
 Note that, in criticizing the fa of the sage-kings, Han Feizi need not also address the other two standards/models of the 17
Mohists, as the three are taken collectively (see Loy 2008, 459).
 Jane Geaney suggests that ming-xing were aural and visual pairs (Geaney 2002, 174)18
 W. K. Liao substitutes ‘矯 jiao [rectiify]’ for ‘教 jiao [educate]’ in “以法教⼼ yifajiaoxin.”19
 Cf. Sima Qian’s characterization of Han Feizi as “[coming] home to his roots in Huang-Lao” (Sima Qian 63.2146, 20
quoted and translated in Goldin 2013, 15; cf. Kim 2010, Queen 2013).
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As it stands, it is not pertinent that the present inquiry determines which of  the two interpretations 
should have primacy, only that Han Feizi does not seem to be able to refute Ru-Mo claims by 
straightforwardly appealing to the same models shared with his opponents and explaining why their 
discriminations are not analogous to their models (the way argumentation would ordinarily proceed, as 
observed by Fraser). For in trying to problematize the affairs of  the sage-kings as appropriate political 
models, Han Feizi cannot argue that the ruler should abandon them by appealing to these very same 
models—a different mode of  political argumentation is therefore warranted. As such, his arguments 
might be better appreciated as underscoring the ‘shameful’ origins of  Ru-Mo judgments that employ 
such models: that is, not so much arguing against them (providing overriding epistemic defeat) but 
debunking them. 
2. Taxonomy of  Genealogical Arguments in the Han Feizi 
Taking Srinivasan’s taxonomy as a heuristic model allows us a clearer picture of  the genealogical (and 
hence epistemological) nature of  Han Feizi’s argumentation. She identifies five common kinds of  
genealogical arguments: the Argument from Insensitivity, the Argument from Explanatory Inertness, the 
Argument from Coincidence, the Argument from Probability on Evidence, and the Argument from Unreliability. The 
first three are already tacitly assumed in materialist and historicist readings of  the “Five Vermin” and 
“Eminence in Learning.” But I hope to ultimately suggest not only that all five of  these are actually 
present in these chapters, but also that the Argument from Unreliability undergirds the rest of  the other 
arguments. 
 2.1. Argument from Insensitivity 
The Argument from Insensitivity (AI) is as follows (Srinivasan 2015, 329): 
(P1) Your judgment that p is insensitive to the truth of  p. 
(P2) Sensitivity is a condition on knowledge. 
(P3) Therefore, you do not know p. 
When one’s judgment is sensitive to the truth of  p, if  p were false, one would not judge that p. But 
where one would believe p, even if  p were false, one is insensitive to its truth. We can observe this in 





Now if  anyone had built wooden nests or drilled for fire in the time of  the Xia dynasty, 
Gun and Yu would have laughed at him, and if  anyone had tried to open channels for the 
water during the Yin or Zhou dynasties, Tang and Wu would have laughed at him. This 
being so, if  people in the present age go about exalting the ways of  Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, 
and Wu, the sages of  today are bound to laugh at them. For the sage does not try to 
practice the ways of  antiquity or to abide by a fixed standard [fachang 法常], but examines 
the affairs [shi] of  the age and takes what precautions are necessary. (Han Feizi, “The Five 
Vermin,” trans. Watson, 97–8) 
Implicit in Han Feizi’s criticism here is that there are indeed ‘people in the present age’ who go about 
exalting the ways of  the sage-kings: the Ru-Mo. They would believe that the ruler needs to do what the 
sage-kings did, as their political models (in this case, model actions), in order to govern even if  it is not 
the case that the ruler needs to do what the sage-kings did in order to govern—and, in fact, it is not. 
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In argument form, the above can be represented as: 
(H1) The Ru-Mo judgments that the ruler needs to fixate on what the sage-kings did (e.g. 
build wooden nests) is insensitive to the truth of  the ruler needing to do what the sage-
kings did. 
(H2) Sensitivity is a condition of  knowledge. 
(H3) Therefore, the Ru-Mo judgments that the ruler needs to do what the sage-kings did 
does not constitute knowledge. 
Implied here is that, in adopting these affairs of  the sage-kings as political models, Ru-Mo judgments 
are insensitive to their lack of  resemblance with what conduces the preservation and strengthening of  
the state in the affairs of  the age. So the Ru-Mo judgments should not be relied upon by the ruler in 
statecraft due to its insensitivity to the natural facts. 
However, as Eirik Lang Harris observes, this argument alone would only be sufficient to undermine “a 
Confucian straw man” (Harris 2013b, 44). He and Sungmoon Kim have argued (to my mind) decisively 
that Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi’s conceptions of  virtuous action necessarily included the agent’s 
sensitivity to the particularities of  a given sociopolitical situation—even adapting laws accordingly (Kim 
2012, Harris 2013b). Both the characteristics of  the virtuous action and agent are inextricable, and so 
the Confucians themselves would not recommend simply transposing actions that were appropriate in 
situations of  the distant past to those of  the present. 
Nevertheless, Han Feizi’s use of  genealogical arguments is more varied than AI. And such variation 
should not be surprising, given his advice that “the difficult thing about persuading others is not that 
one lacks the knowledge needed to state his case nor the audacity to exercise his abilities to the full” but 
to “know the mind of  the person one is trying to persuade and to be able to fit one’s words to it” (Han 
Feizi, “The Difficulties of  Persuasion,” trans. Watson, 74). 
 2.2. Argument from Explanatory Inertness 
The Argument from Explanatory Inertness (AEI) is as follows (Srinivasan 2015, 330–1): 
(P4) Your judgment that p can be explained without mention of  its (putative) truth. 
(P5) When a judgment can be explained without mention of  its (putative) truth, then that 
judgment is unjustified. 
(P6) Therefore, your judgment that p is unjustified. 
A judgment is explanatorily inert when it can be explained without making recourse to its (putative) 
truth (recall truth as being a matter of  resemblance to a model). Consider Han Feizi’s explanation of  
why the Ru-Mo judge it appropriate for a ruler to relinquish his rule in statecraft, which is ordinarily 






When Yao ruled the world, he left the thatch of  his roof  untrimmed, and his speckled 
beams were not planed. He ate coarse millet and a soup of  greens, wore deerskin in winter 
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days and rough fiber robes in summer. Even a lowly gatekeeper was no worse clothed and 
provided for than he. When Yu ruled the world, he took plow and spade in hand to lead his 
people, working until there was no more down on his thighs or hair on his shins. Even the 
toil of  a slave taken prisoner in the wars was no bitterer than his. Therefore those men in 
ancient times who abdicated and relinquished the rule of  the world were, in a manner of  
speaking, merely forsaking the life of  a gatekeeper and escaping from the toil of  a slave. 
Therefore they thought little of  handing over the rule of  the world to someone else. […] 
In the matter of  relinquishing things, people thought nothing of  stepping down from the 
position of  Son of  Heaven in ancient times, yet they are very reluctant to give up the post 
of  district magistrate today; this is because of  the difference in the actual benefits received. 
(Han Feizi, “The Five Vermin,” trans. Watson, 98–9) 
In argument form, the above can be represented as: 
(H4) The Ru-Mo judgments that the relinquishing of  rule is appropriate in statecraft can be 
explained by material circumstances, without mentioning relinquishment’s  
resemblance to the models of  benevolence assumed in the Ru-Mo’s judgments. 
(H5) When a judgment can be explained without mention of  its (putative) truth, then that 
judgment is unjustified. 
(H6) Therefore, the Ru-Mo judgment that the relinquishing of  rule is appropriate in 
statecraft is unjustified. 
Keeping in mind that the relinquishment of  the sage-kings are regarded by the Ru-Mo as the very 
paradigms of  benevolence, we can see how Han Feizi’s critique cuts particularly deep. By employing 
alternative models of  a gatekeeper and a slave (in this case, model agents) for not only explaining the 
appropriateness of  relinquishment in statecraft, but also the sage-kings’ very own actions, Han Feizi is 
able to explain the tallying of  the ming, ‘relinquish one’s rule’, to the shi of  appropriateness to statecraft, 
without making recourse to whether this bears resemblance to the Ru-Mo’s own models of  
benevolence. So it might well be the case that Ru-Mo morality does take into account natural facts, but 
their models are nonetheless explanatorily inert and, consequently, their judgments are unjustified. 
One might observe that that Han Feizi’s AEI is not dissimilar to x-phi situationist worries about 
Aristotelian virtue ethics, which argues from experimental record in psychology that, for a given 
character trait like compassion, trait-relevant behaviour is more robustly explained by situational factors 
than personal factors. Pace AI, it is precisely because “behaviour is […] extraordinarily sensitive to variation 
in circumstance” that virtue is explanatorily redundant (Doris 2002, 2, emphasis mine). However, this 
situationist conception of  character traits is largely behavioural and ignores the agent’s motivating 
reasons for actions, their “dispositions to respond appropriately—in judgment, feeling, and action,” 
which is explanatorily central to an Aristotelian conception of  virtues (Kamtekar 2004, 477). Such 
dispositions are thus explanatorily inert only from a perspective external to the virtuous agent, for 
whom variation in circumstance is itself  only a factor in their exercise of  practical wisdom: virtues, in 
fact, ensure consistency over a set of  actions that may or may not overlap with those sets of  actions 
considered within by the psychological experiments (which are set up by presumably non-virtuous 
agents). 
Similarly, it might well be the case that—even if  Han Feizi was right about the material circumstances
—Yao and Shun could nevertheless have had benevolent motivating reasons for relinquishing their 
rule. What would be crucial is for these reasons to have greater explanatory power than material 
circumstances over a broader range of  situations than (a presumably less-than-virtuous) Han Feizi 
might have picked out of  the historical records. This seems to have been one common line of  
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argument undertaken by those who have explicitly defended Confucianism against this situationist 
challenge (see, e.g., Hutton 2006, Slingerland 2011, Mower 2013).  21
Still, in what follows, we see that Han Feizi goes further to argue that, even if  it were to be conceded 
that virtue is explanatorily fundamental for the sage-kings’ actions, no one during his time could “hope 
to scrutinize the ways of  Yao and Shun, who lived three thousand years ago” (Han Feizi, “Eminence in 
Learning,” trans. Watson, 120). That is, there is no direct access to Yao and Shun’s motivating reasons 
for action and, therefore, they are irrelevant models since they cannot function as sufficiently 
instructive standards in the pattern-recognition required for statecraft.  22
 2.3. Argument from Coincidence 
The Argument from Coincidence (AC) is as follows (Srinivasan 2015, 333): 
(P7) There is no plausible explanation of  how your judgment that p reliably tracks the truth. 
(P8) If  there is no plausible explanation of  how judgments in a domain track the truth in 
that domain, then those judgments are unjustified. 
(P9) Therefore, your judgment that p is unjustified. 
As Srinivasan notes, there is a kinship between AEI and AC in their shared focus on explanation. But 
the former may be denied without denying the latter. That is, we may affirm that there is still some 
explanatory relationship between cases of  conjunctions of  judgment and a truth, in spite of  our ability 
to explain the judgment without making recourse to the truth. As such, it is not a question of  
resemblance to the Ru-Mo’s model here, but resemblance to the model which conduces the 




There was a farmer of  Song who tilled the land, and in his field was a stump. One day a 
rabbit, racing across the field, bumped into the stump, broke its neck, and died. Thereupon 
the farmer laid aside his plow and took up watch beside the stump, hoping that he would 
get another rabbit in the same way. But he got no more rabbits, and instead became the 
laughing stock of  Song. Those who think they can take the ways of  the ancient kings and 
use them to govern the people of  today all belong in the category of  stump-watchers! (Han 
Feizi, “The Five Vermin,” trans. Watson, 98) 
Given that the passage is lodged between the passages which illustrate AI and AEI in the text, it might 
be also read as either merely a rhetorical elaboration of  the AI passage, where those who do not keep 
up with the times are insensitive to the truth (i.e. natural facts), or setting up for the explanatory focus 
of  the later AEI passage. However, unlike AI, the farmer is not being insensitive to a significant change 
in times; and, unlike AEI, there is no counter-explanation provided. 
Alternatively, the passage might be taken as a castigation of  indolence, especially given how it has been 
distilled and propagated today in a popular Chinese idiom (守株待兔 shouzhudaitu). This would be 
resonant with a later passage in “Eminence in Learning” where Han Feizi warns that a ruler should not 
depend on the fortuitousness of  having benevolent subjects just as one would not “depend on arrow 
 N.b. whether Confucian ethics should be read virtue-ethically is in dispute. For those who favour such a reading, see, 21
e.g., Sim 2007, Yu 2007, Tiwald 2010. For non-virtue-ethical readings, see, e.g., Roetz 1993, Lee 2013, Wong 2013.
 This is similar to John Doris’ position on the moral relevance of rare, virtuous agents for the rest of us (Doris 2002).22
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shafts’ becoming straight of  themselves” (Han Feizi, trans. Watson, 127). But it should be observed 
that, as Han Feizi concludes, the rhetoric of  the passage here is such that stump-watching is not 
compared with similar inactivity but the active use of  models of  the sage kings for government. Han 
Feizi is rather emphasizing that the former is just as efficacious as the latter in bringing about desired 
outcomes—which is to say not at all. So even if  it was granted that following ‘the ways of  the ancient 
kings’ had at some point correlated with truth, it would have been through sheer coincidence that they 
had done so.  
Therefore, in argument form, the passage should be rendered as: 
(H7) There is no plausible explanation of  how Ru-Mo political judgments reliably track the 
truth. 
(H8) If  there is no plausible explanation of  how judgments in a domain track the truth in 
that domain, then those judgments are unjustified. 
(H9) Therefore Ru-Mo political judgments are unjustified. 
Just as there is no plausible explanation of  how watching stumps in one’s field tracks rabbits running 
into them (the absurdity for which the farmer was laughed at), there is no plausible explanation of  how 
models of  the sage-kings reliably track what is relevant for appropriate statecraft. As such, judgments 
involving the sage-kings as models are unjustified. 
Furthermore, a farmer “who tilled the land” would not (and has shown not to) have the relevant 
dispositions for ensnaring rabbits. This passage may thus also be taken as addressing the Confucian 
rebuttal to AEI from before: even if  the sage kings had acted out of  benevolent motivating reasons for 
actions, given that Han Feizi’s audience does not have the dispositions to pick up on the situational 
features the sage kings were sensitive to and thus act accordingly, his audience cannot provide 
explanations for how a Ru-Mo judgment tracked truth in statecraft. That is, as far as Han Feizi’s 
audience (who are less-than-virtuous) are concerned, the excellent governance of  the sage kings were 
simply a stroke of  luck (or a series of  them): as model agents and actions, they merely function as 
empty placeholders for one’s aspirations, given insufficient detail for what exactly about the models one 
should be tracking in attempting to match one’s actions to them (cf. Hutton 2008). 
Still, as some have also argued, the Ru-Mo might respond to this by appealing to the possibility of  
indirect access to the reasons for action of  the sage-kings, through what Eric L. Hutton calls “practice 
models” (Hutton 2008, 444n51; cf. Wilson 2018). Especially in the case of  the Confucians, rituals are at 
least partly meant to encode a pedagogical approach to the dispositions of  the sage kings. The rituals 
are themselves means of  situational manipulation, providing a bound space for access to, and the 
development of, the relevant character traits and practical wisdom (Slingerland 2011, Mower 2013, 
Robertson 2018, Wilson 2018, Stapleton 2020). That is, pattern-recognition and comportment to the 
models are not so much a matter of  theoretical knowledge preceding practical knowledge, but the other 
way round. The appropriate judgments for statecraft arise from such practical knowledge. 
Nevertheless, I think we can still find a rejoinder to this from Han Feizi in the opening passages of  
“Eminence in Learning.” Note that so far, for Han Feizi’s AI, AEI, and AC, the genealogical 
contingencies that compromise Ru-Mo judgments largely pertain to the content of  particular judgments 
(which are then to be generalized to all Ru-Mo judgments). As such, it should not come as a surprise 
that the epistemological background of  his criticisms has been thus far overlooked in most 
considerations of  them, which centre on “The Five Vermin” (e.g. Harris 2013, Cook 2015). At the 
same time, the reason why the pedagogical defence might seem to be a more successful response is that 
it shifts the emphasis away from the presumed relevance of  the then-and-there sage kings to how the 
knower here and now is able to retrospectively draw on the models of  the sage kings for themselves. 
The next argument, however, attends to the genealogical contingencies of  the judges themselves, such 
that even this indirect access would be considered inappropriate for statecraft. 
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 2.4. Argument from Probability on Evidence 
Consider the Argument from Probability on Evidence (APE), which is is as follows (Srinivasan 2015, 335): 
(P10) Conditional on the relevant genealogical evidence, it is no more than 0.5 probable that 
your judgment that p is true. 
(P11) If  it is no more than 0.5 probable that a given one of  one’s judgment is true, 
conditional on the relevant genealogical evidence, then that judgment is unjustified. 
(P12) Therefore, your judgment that p is unjustified. 
If  a judgment (for example, ‘a man should not refuse to be treated like a slave’), wherever it came from, 
is a result of  a certain development which has no causal relationship to its truth, then it is a 
metaphorical coin-toss for whether it is correct or incorrect (hence 0.5). And it is this improbability of  
Ru-Mo judgments to secure the model of  even the sage-kings which we find in the opening passages 
of  “Eminence in Learning.” Here, Han Feizi provides us with a family tree (n.b. an explicit genealogy) 






The Confucians pay the highest honor to Confucius, the Mohists to Mozi. Since the death 
of  Confucius, the Zizhang School, the Zisi School, the Yan Family School, the Meng 
Family School, the Qidiao Family School, the Zhongliang Family School, the Sun Family 
School, and the Yuezheng Family School have appeared. Since the death of  Mozi, the 
Xiangli Family School, the Xiangfu Family School, and the Dengling Family School have 
appeared. Thus, since the death of  its founder, the Confucian school has split into eight 
factions, and the Mohist school into three. Their doctrines and practices are different or 
even contradictory, and yet each claims to represent the true teaching of  Confucius and 
Mozi. But since we cannot call Confucius and Mozi back to life, who is to decide which of  
the present versions of  the doctrine is the right one? (Han Feizi, “Eminence in Learning,” 
trans. Watson, 119) 
With these schools having contrary judgments, the likelihood that any adopted Ru-Mo position arising 
from these developments matches that of  its founder is, ceteris paribus, even less than a coin-toss 
(assuming that one of  them is right). For the Confucians schools, it is 0.125; for the Mohist schools, it 
is 0.333. That is to say, the probability that judgments based on a given model from any Confucian 
school might actually represent the judgments of  Confucius or any Mohist school might represent 





Confucius and Mozi both followed the ways of  Yao and Shun, and though their practices 
differed, each claimed to be following the real Yao and Shun. But since we cannot call Yao 
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and Shun back to life, who is to decide whether it is the Confucians or the Mohists who are 
telling the truth? 
 Now over seven hundred years have passed since Yin and early Zhou times, and over two 
thousand years since Yu and early Xia times. If  we cannot even decide which of  the 
present versions of  Confucian and Mohist doctrine are the genuine ones, how can we hope 
to scrutinize the ways of  Yao and Shun, who lived three thousand years ago? Obviously we 
can be sure of  nothing! He who claims to be sure of  something for which there is no 
evidence is a fool, and he who acts on the basis of  what cannot be proved is an imposter. 
Hence it is clear that those who claim to follow the ancient kings and to be able to de- 
scribe with certainty the ways of  Yao and Shun must be either fools or imposters. (Han 
Feizi, “Eminence in Learning,” trans. Watson, 119–20) 
Filtered through historical layers of  disagreement, not only do we find any Ru-Mo claim to the model 
of  Confucius or Mozi by the existing schools to be probabilistically compromised, but also their claim 
to model of  the sage-kings, whereupon the former model is meant to be based in the first place. The 
chances that the content of  any given model advanced by a Confucian or Mohist school would allow 
one to judge as the sage-kings Yao and Shun did may be mathematically represented as follows: 
If  one follows a Confucian school, the probability that one judges correctly is 
P[(Confucius is right)⋀(a Confucian school is right)] 
= P(Confucius is right) × P(a Confucian school is right|Confucius is right) 
= (0.5) × (0.125) 
= 0.0625 
If  one follows a Mohist school, the probability that one judges correctly is 
P[(Mozi is right)⋀(a Mohist school is right)] 
= P(Mozi is right) × P(a Mohist school is right|Mozi is right) 
= (0.5) × (0.333) 
= 0.167 
In argument form, all of  the above can thus be represented as: 
(H10) It is no more than 0.0625 probable that any of  the disputed Confucian judgments of  
the existing schools or 0.167 probable that any of  the disputed Mohist judgments 
is(putatively) true. 
(H11) If  it is no more than 0.5 probable that a given one of  one’s judgment is true, 
conditional on the relevant genealogical evidence, then that judgment is unjustified. 
(H12) Therefore, none of  the disputed Ru-Mo judgments of  the existing schools are justified. 
We see, therefore, that following any Ru-Mo school—whose judgments are in disagreement with each 
other—would result in unjustified judgments, even if  the affairs of  the sage-kings Yao and Shun were 
assumed to be appropriate models for statecraft. And given that the very paradigmatic models are in 
dispute, there is no way to adjudicate between the disagreement. As such, even if  Confucian rituals are 
to be claimed as providing access to the reasons for action of  Yao and Shun indirectly through the 
rituals, they would be unjustified. 
Notably, Han Feizi’s APE only targets disputed judgments. Yet even the Confucians and Mohists do 
sometimes agree in their judgments: for example, contra Han Feizi, they agree on the centrality of  
benevolence as a virtue for rulership. But that the scepticism is now directly targeting the contingencies 
of  the producer of  these judgments brings us closer to the final argument to be considered. The heart 
of  the problem of  Ru-Mo political judgments, for Han Feizi, is the very method upon which such 
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political judgments are generally made. That is, the method of  employing the sage-kings as models is 
inherently unreliable. 
3. The Master Argument from Unreliability 
One way that reliability has been understood in epistemology more generally is through a notion of  
safety, where 
S’s belief  in the proposition p is safe iff  S could not have easily believed ¬p using a 
sufficiently similar method they use to believe p. 
That is, one’s judgment that p would be unreliable iff  in a sufficiently similar case one believes that p 
but p is false. Based on this, Argument from Unreliability AU is as follows (Srinivasan 2015, 339): 
(P13) The genealogy of  your judgment that p constitutes strong, undefeated evidence that 
your judgment that p is unsafe. 
(P14) Whenever one has strong, undefeated evidence that one of  one’s judgments is unsafe, 
one ought to abandon it. 
(P15) Therefore, you ought to abandon your judgment that p. 
So if  genealogy reveals that one’s appeal to a particular model is able to generate contradictory 
judgments in relevantly similar cases, the appeal to that model is unreliable and ought to be abandoned. 
This would be especially problematic for the kind of  reliabilist epistemology of  pattern-recognition 
that we are considering here for the late Warring States Period. The unreliability of  one’s appeal to a 
given model could be a result of  at least three factors: (i) the particular model being used is unreliable, 
(ii) one’s ability to use models is unreliable (such as frequently employing the wrong models), or (iii) the 
very method of  appealing to the models of  the sage-kings is itself  unreliable. We see all three in a 






Dantai Ziyu had the appearance of  a gentleman. Confucius, considering him promising, 
accepted him as a disciple but, after associating with him for some time, he found that his 
actions did not come up to his looks. Cai Yu’s speech was elegant and refined and 
Confucius, considering him promising, accepted him as a disciple. But after associating 
with him, he found that his wisdom did not match his eloquence. Therefore Confucius 
said, “Should I choose a man on the basis of  looks? I made a mistake with Ziyu. Should I 
choose a man on the basis of  his speech? I made a mistake with Cai Yu.” Thus even 
Confucius, for all his wisdom, had to admit that he judged the facts wrongly. Now our new 
orators today are far more voluble than Cai Yu, and the rulers of  the age far more 
susceptible to delusion than Confucius. If  they appoint men to office simply because they 
are pleased with their words, how can they fail to make mistakes? 
 Wei trusted the eloquence of  Meng Mao and met with calamity below Mount Hua. Zhao 
trusted the eloquence of  Mafu and encountered disaster at Changping. These two instances 
show what mistakes can be made by trusting men because of  their eloquence. (Han Feizi, 
“Eminence in Learning,” trans. Watson, 124) 
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In argument form, the above can be represented as: 
(H13) The genealogy of  judgments that looks and eloquence imply desired actions and 
wisdom constitute strong, undefeated evidence that such judgments are unsafe. 
(H14) Whenever one has strong, undefeated evidence that one of  one’s judgments is unsafe, 
one ought to abandon it. 
(H15) Therefore, judgments that looks and eloquence imply desired actions and wisdom 
ought to be abandoned. 
There are two instances of  judgments of  looks and eloquence which are being addressed here: those of  
Confucius and those of  the rulers of  the age. In the case of  the former, Confucius judges that Dantai 
Ziyu would produce the relevant desired actions, for to say here that ‘one has the relevant looks’ means 
that one would resemble the model of  the sage-kings with the desired actions. He also judges that Cai 
Yu would be wise, for to say here that ‘one is eloquent’ means that one would resemble the model of  
the sage-kings with wisdom. However, on the bases of  these models, we find that Confucius produces 
judgments that are contrary to those he is otherwise expected to make. Hence, we find that (i) the 
particular Confucian models (whether agents or actions) are unreliable. This is not dissimilar to the 
genealogical scepticism in AI, AEI, and AC. 
In the case of  the latter, the rulers of  the age (for example, Wei and Zhao), who would regard 
Confucius’ affairs as a model through which they would attain the model of  the sage-kings, find 
themselves with ostensibly less reliable judgments as they do not have the wisdom of  Confucius. That 
is, whether or not the particular models are unreliable, (ii) their particular act of  appealing to the models 
are themselves unreliable. This is, again, not dissimilar to the genealogical scepticism in APE. 
But AU is especially important as a kind of  genealogical scepticism that gets to the core of  the 
reliabilist epistemology under consideration: it lends itself  to a higher-order criticism of  the reliability 
of  the very method of  using the models of  the sage-kings as bases for political judgments. In the 
subtext of  the passage, we understand Han Feizi to be banking on the fact that his audience hold 
Confucius in high regard—Han Feizi himself  even seems to do so, describing Confucius as “one of  the 
greatest sages of  the world” and “truly benevolent and righteous” (Han Feizi, “The Five Vermin,” trans. 
Watson, 103). And by shifting the emphasis of  the criticism in these passages away from specific Ru-
Mo judgments to Confucius’ own use of  such models, Han Feizi is not simply highlighting the 
unreliability of  the particular models under consideration here, but underscoring that even the ideal 
epistemic agent (the ideal model-user) cannot reliably make reliable political judgments on the basis of  
such models. Importantly, this allows us to move from the claim that particular models—and hence 
judgments—are unreliable to the claim that (iii) the entire method of  appealing to the models of  the 
sage-kings is itself  unreliable. 
With AU, therefore, the entire method of  the sage-kings shown to be unreliable tout court, and we can 
now see how it is that the particular models in each of  the above genealogical arguments have turned 
out to be insensitive, explanatorily inert, merely coincidental, and improbable on evidence: these 
problems arise from taking for granted reasoning with an unsafe, unreliable method for judging 
political matters. AU may hence be regarded as the ‘master argument’, whose occurrence, we might 
note, is immediately followed by Han Feizi’s solution: 
觀容服，聽辭⾔，仲尼不能以必⼠；試之官職，課其功伐，則庸⼈不疑於愚智。 
[…] if  one were only to observe a man’s features and dress and listen to his speech, then 
even Confucius could not be certain what kind of  person he is. But if  one tries him out in 
government office and examines his achievements, then even a man of  mediocre judgment can tell 
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whether he is stupid or wise. (Han Feizi, “Eminence in Learning,” trans. Watson, 124–5, 
emphasis mine) 
Of  course, this is not an abandonment of  the use of  models as such, especially given the importance 
that fa has for Han Feizi’s political framework. That is, he does not advocate a non-reliabilist 
epistemology in place of  the Ru-Mo’s method of  judging with models of  sage-kings. Rather, Han Feizi 
is suggesting that an enlightened ruler may sidestep all the problems of  its intrinsically unreliability (and 
thus also AI, AEI, AC, and APE) by employing his approach to epistemology, one which is more 
directly concerned with the preservation and strengthening of  the state: letting names define 
themselves and affairs reach their own settlement. So “whenever [the enlightened ruler] listens to any 
speech, [he] would hold it accountable for its utility, and when he observes any deed, [he] would seek 
for its merit”—instead of  needing to (also) attend to its conformity to the models of  the sage kings 
(Han Feizi, “Six Contrarieties [六反 liufan],” trans. Liao 1959b, 247). However exactly this and, more 
broadly, Han Feizi’s own epistemology should be more substantially understood, the critique provided 
with the foregoing arguments, taken collectively, thus cannot simply be addressed by appeals to an 
expanded morality or a pedagogical approach to historical imagination, since both these still rely on the 
inherently unreliable models of  the sage kings. 
Concluding Remarks 
I have argued in the above that, in addition to the extant materialist and historicist readings, Han Feizi’s 
criticisms in “The Five Vermin” and “Eminence in Learning” would be more comprehensively 
appreciated if  read as deploying genealogical arguments against the political recommendations of  the 
Confucians and Mohists. And in doing so, we can better appreciate the political epistemology and 
extent of  Han Feizi’s scepticism in them, which goes beyond the responses made on behalf  of  at least 
the Confucians thus far. Further, we may note that one distinctive feature of  Han Feizi’s genealogical 
scepticism, compared to more contemporary instances of  genealogical argumentation that target 
necessity claims (e.g. x-phi on moral claims), is that it is particularly fitted to a reliabilist-epistemological 
milieu and does not on its own advocate abandoning it. 
That said, as mentioned at the outset, genealogical arguments are haunted by “a spectre of  self-defeat” 
(Srinivasan 2015, 328). A key feature of  a successful negative genealogy is for it to rest on more 
defensible epistemological grounds than those of  the accounts it undermines. What is crucial in the 
next steps beyond this present investigation into Han Feizi’s epistemology in “The Five Vermin” and 
“Eminence in Learning” is thus to answer how the problem of  genealogical contingency from AU does 
not also undermine his own proposals. So if  Han Feizi is to escape self-defeat, it is imperative to move 
from here to furnishing a substantive account of  his political epistemology. In any case, I hope that 
these considerations would not only serve as an impetus to greater discussion on Han Feizi’s 
epistemology, but also contribute to the increasing interest in the genealogy of  the genealogical 
method. 
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